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In the years following the Arab Uprisings, conflict across the Middle East has taken on 
an increasingly sectarian nature, seemingly pitting sunni against shi’i in a 21st Century 
reworking of a primordial struggle. As history has shown us there is nothing inherently 
violent about sectarian difference, yet as such identities become bearers of political 
meaning, differences have the capacity to become increasingly violent.1  Speaking 
before the 9/11 attacks the then Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin 
Sultan Al Sa’ud stated that ‘The time is not far off in the Middle East when it will be 
literally “God help the shi’a”! More than a billion sunni have simply had enough of 
them’2.   
 
This quote sharply illuminates a deep-seated thread in Saudi political thought which 
reveals much about themselves, and their relationships with others – principally the 
shi’a and how they – and others similarly – choose to use the sectarian as a tool for 
contemporary political ends.  To understand the emergence of sectarian violence, we 
must then locate and separate meaning that is proscribed to these identities. But the 
labels mask huge regional and cultural variation in what it means to be shi’i (and sunni) 
and, also, what is perhaps actually happening.   However, since we are considering 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, our focus is Wahhabism and Twelver Shi’ism, the belief systems 
that are dominant within the two states. Theology matters, without question; but a 
struggle for leadership, political pre-eminence is, we suggest, the principal driver for 
contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran and shapes contemporary sunni-shi’i 
“relations” in the Middle East, and also further east.  Moreover, this position also 
frames a “Western” view of what is taking place which can confuse both 
understanding the issues from that perspective and also the nature of external 
relationships with regional players. As a consequence, it also shapes how Western 
actors engage with the region, on the basis of their (miss)perceptions. 
                                                        
1 Simon Mabon and Stephen Royle, The Origins of ISIS: The Collapse of Order and Revolution 
in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017) 
2 Bandar was talking to the then Chief of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, quoted by Patrick 
Cockburn, The Age of Jihad; Islamic State and the Great war for the Middle East (Verso, 
2016), p. 350 
 
Within the literature on Saudi-Iranian relations are three main approaches that seek 
to understand the rivalry. The first approach 3  suggests that the best way to 
characterise the rivalry is to frame it within debates about the balance of power within 
the Persian Gulf.  Regional security then plays a prominent role in shaping the rivalry, 
with a Manichean view of regional order resulting in the emergence of serious 
tensions between the two. The second approach4 suggests that religion cannot be 
ignored and that to understand the nature of the rivalry across the Gulf, one must 
understand how religious identities emerge and how sectarian divisions are 
constructed.  The third approach suggests that we must combine questions about the 
distribution of power across the Middle East with a consideration of the spread of 
religious identities and the construction of sectarian divisions.5  We locate ourselves 
in this third camp, stressing that both religion and security are of paramount 
importance but that we must understand how the issues interact with one another 
and their local context. 
 
Given this, the importance of political context should not be understated.  Since the 
events of 1979 – the revolution in Iran, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, 
the uprisings in the Eastern Province, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
beginning of the Afghan wars, and the Camp David Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty – 
religion has become an increasingly important tool of the foreign policies of states 
across the Middle East.  Religion plays a political role, serving to ensure the legitimacy 
of particular ruling élites, whilst also providing scope to interfere in the domestic 
events of other regional states.  This chapter seeks to interrogate the role of religion 
within the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  In doing that, we must begin by 
providing a theological overview of the differences between sunna and shi’a and their 
role within the fabric of the Saudi Arabian and Iranian states.  We then turn to a 
discussion of the theological tensions between the two before considering how 
religion is used as a tool of geopolitical interests. We end by considering how religion 
and geopolitics play out within the context of the Arab Uprisings and the 
fragmentation of state sovereignty across the Middle East.   
 
The Religious and The Political 
 
Prince Bandar’s sense of an approaching crisis was prescient, yet not quite as 
conveniently binary as he had suggested, nor even as balanced in favour of the sunna 
as his rhetoric would imply.  The battle lines are, of course, presently drawn as sharply 
between competing sunni narratives, as the conflicting responses from Gulf States to 
the rise of Islamic State (IS) and the temporary rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt under President Morsi bear witness.  But with Iran in mind as Saudi King Salman 
                                                        
3 Henner Furtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia: Between the Gulf Wars (Reading: Ithaca 
Press, 2006); and Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and 
Regional Order (London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1996).   
4See Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2007) 
5 See Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2013) 
surveys the contemporary Middle East, the Saudis see a ranging of shi’i influence6 in 
the region - if not direct control from - that emanates for them from Tehran.   
 
Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sana’a feature prominently within that perceived 
Saudi worldview of shi’i encroachment although, as said, it is simplistic for them and 
us simply to refer to the shi’a as if they were a neat homogenous bloc, disregarding 
ethnicity, tribalism and ultimately politics.  They clearly are not, even aside from the 
obvious ethno-political distinctions of Arab and Persian, any more than Saudi Arabia’s 
own population is a single coherent force; and the Al Sa’ud are torn between an 
internally attractive and comforting drive to try to make all Saudis unquestioningly 
adhere to the tenets of Wahhabism7  on the one hand, and trying to navigate an 
external, more pluralist strategy that does acknowledge diversity. The implications of 
such issues are severe, not only for internal security but also for external factors 
contributing to the construction of regime security.  Understanding the “Islamo-
Liberal”8 trend (an outward-facing line of thought opposing the hard-line conservative 
salafi jihadis) in modern Saudi Arabia is as relevant as unpicking that unhealthy 
support that Saudi Arabia has directly or indirectly9 offered to the likes of IS, and 
examining its own emergence as a modern state delivered by Ibn Sa’ud’s ikhwan in 
the early 20th century.  
 
Similarly, in Iran, the tension between progressive social movement and political 
conservatism is a wider gap to manage than between the various conservatisms of 
Saudi Arabia; the shi’a have kept alive better than the sunna the concept of being able 
to adapt and change the message of the revelations to each generation.  What is 
known as ijtihad – from the same Arabic word root as jihad - is the way in which the 
religious experts of a given generation may provide exegesis of the Qur’an.  In the 
tradition of the sunna this process was completed several centuries ago, where the 
“gates of ijtihad were closed” and the four schools of sunni Islam were codified and 
handed down10.  In the shi’i tradition they were kept wide open.  There is a theological 
and political dynamic in the Iranian shi’i relationship with the world that is both 
advantageous (and challenging to the likes of Saudi Arabia and the “West”) and self-
threatening in that it allows for a greater and often constantly implicit test of the 
authority of the Council of Guardians within Iran.  But Iranian identity is indeed 
wrapped tightly in the shi’i cloth, albeit with Persian nationalist trim.  In Arabia, there 
is a tension that drives deep into how Saudi Arabia identifies itself that is more 
challenging than the simple piety of being the Guardian of the Two Holy Places.  
 
                                                        
6 What King ‘Abdallah II of Jordan in 2016 called a “crescent of shi’a”, reflecting a changing 
balance of power and influence across the region, particularly stemming from the location of 
Shi’i communities. 
7 The particularly conservative strain of sunni Islam preached initially by Muhammad ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhab following the hanbali school 
8 Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi Arabia’ in Paul Aarts & Gerd Nonneman 
(Eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance; Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (Hurst & Co.: 
London, 2005), pp. 35 - 56 
9 Be that through the provision of financial or ideological support 
10 hanafi, maliki, shafi’i and hanbali 
Geography plays its part, too.   Most recently the Second Gulf War in 2003 resulted in 
a huge change in the local landscape of the Arab lands; for the first time the shi’a are 
in Government of an Arab country in Iraq.  Saudi Arabia, already concerned at the 
charismatic attraction of Hizballah and Iran in the aftermath of the 2006 war in 
Lebanon and what it sees as a marginalising of Levantine Sunnism, is now trying to 
reassert a sunni hegemony, to devastating effect in Syria.  Across the region, alliances 
have been formed that have largely taken place along sectarian lines.  In Lebanon, 
Iraq, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, the importance of sectarian identity largely secures 
the support of sectarian kin in the Gulf.  Yet the case of Hamas proves to be an outlier.  
As a member of the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’,11 a group comprised of Iran, Syria 
and Hizballah, Hamas’ rejection of Israel and the regional status quo sees geopolitical 




It is politics rather than theology or dogma that is the struggle; the division in Islam 
between sunna and shi’a is far more to do with legitimacy of leadership of the 
community than profound religious differences.  After the Prophet’s death in 632 
there was argument about who should succeed the Prophet Muhammad and have 
authority over the Islamic community (umma12), and whether this succession should 
be based on kinship to Muhammad or on the worthiness of the successor, khalifah 
(Caliph) in his knowledge of the life of the Prophet and his teachings.  Those who 
favoured Muhammad’s descendants proposed his cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali; they 
were the “party of ‘Ali” (shi’at ‘ali).  Others favoured the Prophet’s closest male 
companion, Abu Bakr who duly became the first khalifah (Caliph).  ‘Ali got his turn 
then only after ‘Umar and ‘Uthman13 and whilst the sunna regard all four Caliphs as 
legitimate, the shi’a begin their allegiance after Muhammad with ‘Ali whom they style 
“Imam” (not Caliph). 
 
The theological differences between the sunna and shi’a are actually negligible - but 
handily played upon by both sides and, frequently unwittingly, overplayed in turn by 
external observers.  Both sunni and shi’i are orthodox, recognised parts of Islam.   The 
shi’a are not some off-shoot of sunni Islam; the different paths have their origin in that 
argument about the succession following the death of the Prophet.  The Qur’an and 
the hadith(s) are shared plinths, as are the Five Pillars of Islam: the shahadah (the 
professions of faith bearing witness to the one god, Allah and his Prophet, 
Muhammad); salat (prayer); zakat (the paying of alms); sawm (fasting in the month 
of Ramadhan); and hajj (pilgrimage to Makkah).  Sunni myths about shi’i belief in 
different texts, straying from the “true path” and general takfiri slanders about the 
shi’a are manufactured.  Doctrinal and religious self-definition and differentiation 
came after - was added to - an already well understood social construct based on 
group loyalty (‘asabiya).  The vehement resistance to difference, dissent (fitna) 
“otherness” that pervades so much apparently religious disagreement today in the 
                                                        
11 Rola El-Husseini, ‘Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and  Syria’, Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 5 (2010)   
12 The umma – those people who are the objects of a divine plan for salvation 
13 The Rashidun – the “Rightly Guided” – Caliphs  
Saudi-Iranian context taps into this ancient core sense of identity.  ‘For posterity, 
history became overlaid with meta-history, so much so that the actual events were 
less important than the accretions of myth and sentiment surrounding them.’14  But it 
is identity less than sectarianism, power less that rightness that drives the struggle.  
Perhaps the most important feature distinguishing shi’a from sunna since the end of 
the eighteenth century is the separation of religious and political authority and the 
consequent autonomy of the religious institutions from the state.   
 
We should not ignore the power of religion within the Middle East. Sectarian 
difference is an integral part of the construction of identity politics and such identities 
– and their histories – have strong contemporary relevance when understanding the 
behaviour of a range of actors today. Take, for instance, the legacy of the Battle of 
Karbala, which occupies a central role within shi’i thought.  The battle saw the deaths 
– martyrdom – of Hussein and ‘Ali, establishing feelings of guilt, shared martyrdom 
and sacrifice, which are central to the shi’a identity today.15 Moreover, the notion of 
acting in support of marginalized peoples, particularly the shi’a.  
 
It is temptingly easy to point to modern Saudi Arabia and Iran and to define their 
actions in polarising, sectarian terms.  Both, indeed, are “sectarian” in terms of their 
desire to mould their own population’s identity – Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, Twelver 
shi’ism in Iran.  So they duly both use sectarianism in their projection of regional 
power.  Nevertheless, it is striking how careful both parties are themselves not to 
ascribe sectarian divisiveness as a reason for their contest for regional influence; it is 
other commentators who pin that badge on things.  Saudi Arabia and Iran are playing 
to regional domestic audiences (Arab and Persian) whose ears are better attuned to 
getting along with each other than most external observers would credit, and has 
historically been the case for centuries; ethnicity, history, shared space and tribal 
hinterlands provide a deeper foundation for many of the relationships being tested 
currently.  And those same foreign observers who try to make sense exclusively by 
seeing dichotomies find a recognisable Cold War paradigm in presenting the Saudi-
Iran “contest” in sectarian terms whether that fits or not locally or chronologically. 
 
Islamic Narratives and Political Action 
 
The power of Islamic narratives and the demographics of the region, where sunni 
often lived side by side with shi’i, meant that a number of Middle Eastern states were 
left open to external interference from states who were able to mobilize such 
narratives. Speaking to the umma involved transcending state borders, adding to 
security concerns.  
 
The constitution of the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran demonstrates this more 
universalist approach, stressing: 
 
                                                        
14 Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World (Pelican Books, 1984), p. 181 
15 See, for instance, Simon Mabon, ‘Hizballah, muqawimmah and the rejection of ‘being 
thus’’, Religion, Politics and Ideology, 18:1 (2017) and Nasr, Op Cit. 
the cultural, social, political, and economic institutions of Iranian society based 
on Islamic principles and norms, which represent an honest aspiration of the 
Islamic umma. This aspiration was exemplified by the nature of the great 
Islamic Revolution of Iran, and by the course of the Muslim people's struggle, 
from its beginning until victory, as reflected in the decisive and forceful calls 
raised by all segments of the populations.   
 
In contrast, the constitution of Saudi Arabia is more focussed upon the exclusivity of 
a statehood with more tightly defined edges: 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its 
religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's prayers and peace 
be upon him, are its constitution. 
 
1979 proved to be a seismic year within the Middle East, witnessing an Islamic 
revolution in Iran, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia and the rise to 
power of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. These events would dramatically alter the balance 
of power across the Gulf region and had serious implications for the construction of 
Middle Eastern security calculations. The events brought Islam – and Islamic 
difference – to the forefront of political calculations that got to the very heart of 
régimes across the region. In Saudi Arabia, the Al Sa’ud faced existential threats to 
their legitimacy both internally and externally, stemming from the concept that 
religion serves as a ‘double – edged sword’. For the Al Sa’ud, religion served as a 
means of ensuring their political vitality and the centuries old alliance with the 
Wahhabis was instrumental in creating the third – and current – Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia in 1932. This concept demonstrates how religion (and other concepts) can 
serve two different roles, both legitimizing a régime by demonstrating Islamic 
credentials whilst also providing other actors with fertile ground to criticize rulers for 
not being Islamic enough. 
 
In the years following the 1979 revolution in Iran, the region witnessed an 
instrumental use of Islam for political ends. Religious rhetoric and symbolism became 
a prominent feature of foreign policy behavior, serving to speak to domestic and 
foreign audiences, opening up a new front for rivalry between states. The 
establishment of an explicitly Islamic state only 200 kilometers from the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia would be a serious concern to many in Riyadh.  Yet in the 
formative stages of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini would initially 
seek to demonstrate unity across the umma:. 
 
There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, for 
instance the Arabs and the Persians. It is very probable that such problems 
have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries to be united 
[. . .] They create the issues of nationalism, of pan-Iranianism, pan-Turkism, 
and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines.  Their plan is to destroy 
Islam and Islamic philosophy.16  
 
Things quickly changed however:  
 
We will export our experiences to the whole world and present the outcome 
of our struggles against tyrants to those who are struggling along the path of 
God, without expecting the slightest reward. The result of this exportation will 
certainly result in the blooming of the buds of victory and independence and 
in the implementation of Islamic teachings among the enslaved Nations.17 
 
Such vitriolic rhetoric would become directed at the Al Sa’ud, which became a prime 
target for the régime in Iran.   
 
If we wanted to prove to the world that the Saudi Government, these vile and 
ungodly Saudis, are like daggers that have always pierced the heart of the 
Moslems from the back, we would not have been able to do it as well as has 
been demonstrated by these inept and spineless leaders of the Saudi 
Government.18 
 
It was also the case that after the 1979 overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the return of 
Ayatallah Khomeini, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the shared resistance to 
that between the US, UK and Saudi Arabia that the “West” paid scant attention to 
Saudi/sunni support for sunni fundamentalism, being distracted by what appeared to 
be the more threatening version of “Islamic fundamentalism” taking shape in Tehran 
and spawning proxies in the likes of Hizballah in Lebanon.  The shi’a then were globally 
seen as anti-American, hostage-taking and suicide bombing terrorists.   Saudi Arabia 
was then seen - if it was considered in this way at all – as wanting both to control its 
own shi’a minority in the Eastern Province of the country and to stem Khomeini’s 
challenge to the Islamic legitimacy of the Al Sa’ud and their Kingdom.   
 
Despite the increasing prominence of Iran and its proxies in the years after the 
revolution, it was sunni militancy that began to grow to become the dominant concern 
globally from the early 1990s onwards even if it took time for this to be recognised. In 
the decades that followed, sectarian difference became co-opted by states and 
régimes seeking to perpetuate their national interest, using religion as a tool through 
which to achieve this. Set against the centuries of relatively constructive cohabitation 
experienced by the wider sunni and shi’i communities this is far more challenging for 
the likes of a Prince Bandar.  It truly is fundamental. Whilst many suggest that the 
Middle East is experiencing its own ’30 years war’, akin to that experienced by Europe 
in the 17th century, such an approach is both Orientalist and suggestive of a linear 
                                                        
16 Lawrence Rubin, Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics (Stanford: 
Stanford Security Studies, 2014), p2 
17 Ibid., p7 
18 Ibid., p5 
process of development that all states must go through.  It is also factually inaccurate 
in so far as parallels can be accurate.19  
 
From this, it appears that it is sunni militancy and Wahhabi activism, not shi’i 
revolutionary fervour, remains the greatest danger to those inside and outside the 
region not wholly devoted to the dogma of the likes of ISIS, because that sunni 
militancy is an uncritical, self-justifying, ideological (and cruelly violent) force that is 
not only anti-shi’i but also explicitly anti-anything other than itself (a hard part of the 
equation for conservative salafis in Saudi Arabia to swallow even if their salafi jihadi 
outliers welcome it).  The use of an acerbic sectarian discourse since the so-called Arab 
Spring is a striking aspect of Saudi rhetoric empowering the takfiri jihadis. 
 
 
But before examining the geopolitics and fragmentations in the region more (see 
below) let us return to the question of identity.  Saudi Arabia and Iran are modern 
names for places.  The degree to which their chosen ideological standpoint shapes 
their worldview has fuelled the aberration of bitter sectarian struggle.  But from where 
did the two states emerge?  And how has that process shaped the position of the 
current stage? 
 
In Persia, Twelver shi’ism took form under the sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sadeq (d.765).  
Ja’far specifically dissociated overarching religious authority from any political rule.  
Unlike the sunni mainstream, Twelver shi’ism has always refrained from giving the 
ruling powers any religious authority.  The Safavids turned Persia from sunni to shi’i in 
the early 16th Century by military force.  The Safavids were a millenarian sufi warrior 
order.  The extremist fervour of the fighters for the early Safavid conquest was 
valuable in conquest but less so in subsequent state creation when it became a threat.  
The Safavids used Arab shi’a to inculcate ”moderate” twelver shi’ism and created an 
emergent priestly rule (hierocracy). The Safavid legacy remains important, with the 
term used to negatively denote Iranian influence in Iraq. 
 
In Arabia, in the Nejd desert of the 18th Century Muhammad ibn Sa’ud made his 
politico-religious pact with Muhammad ibn ‘abd al-Wahhab, the ascetic revivalist, and 
propagated Wahhabism across the region.  Subsequently defeated by forces from the 
Ottoman Empire in1818 the al Sa’ud lost power.  Over the following century they 
struggled with a rival tribe until in 1902 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ’abd al-Rahman Al Sa’ud 
returned from British Kuwait and with a force of fanatically motivated Wahhabis (the 
ikhwan) conquered the Nejd, what is the modern day Eastern Province and took the 
Hejaz (and Makkah and Medinah).  At which point, rather like the Persians, the Al 
Sa’ud then had to eliminate the ikhwan who had a too fundamental view of the 
overlap of politics and religion. 
 
This tension about who controls which levers of power, and how, persists: 
                                                        
19 Stemming from the nature of political organization across the region and the extent to 
which states have been established. The 30 years war was an attempt to attain control and 
establish autonomous areas. Across the Middle East, this set of conflicts is about influence 
and ultimately, geopolitics.  
 
Know that kingship and religion are twin brothers; there is no strength for one 
of them except through its companion, because religion is the foundation of 
kingship, and kingship the protector of religion.  Kingship needs its foundation 
and religion its protector, as whatever lacks a protector perishes and whatever 
lacks a foundation is destroyed.  What I fear most for you is the assault of the 
populace.  Be attentive to the teaching of religion, and to its interpretation and 
understanding.  You will be carried by the glory of kingship to disdain religion, 
its teaching, interpretation and comprehension.  Then there will arise within 
religion leaders lying hidden among the lowly from the populace and the 
subjects and the bulk of the masses – those whom you have wronged, 
tyrannised, deprived and humiliated. ’20 
 
From this, it is clear that religion and politics are intertwined and that we cannot 
analyse one without the other. Moreover, although couched in religious terms, what 
we are dealing with is an attempt to shape the political environment within which 
ruling elites are located. This environment transcends the domestic and with the 
presence of sectarian kin across the Middle East also includes regional politics.  
 
A Geopolitical Approach 
 
To understand the nature of contemporary relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
one must return to the years before the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, to engage 
with factors that shaped the rivalry between the two.  At this time, whilst there was a 
degree of mutual suspicion with occasionally fractious periods, the two were largely 
able to co-exist. The discovery of oil would play a transformative role within Middle 
Eastern states and also their foreign policies.  In the case of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, 
oil provided a new dimension for tensions, whilst also boosting domestic capabilities. 
Such rapid societal changes – both demographic and technological – would have 
serious ramifications for the nature of domestic and foreign policy, providing financial 
means for regimes to pursue their agendas.  At this time, the Shah of Iran realising 
wrote a letter to King Faisal, urging him to modernize the Kingdom: "Please, my 
brother, modernize.  Open up your country.  Make the schools mixed women and 
men. Let women wear miniskirts. Have discos. Be modern. Otherwise I cannot 
guarantee you will stay on your throne."21  
 
It would also lead to growing international focus upon the region and, ultimately the 
penetration of the region by external powers.  Such penetration can be traced to the 
turn of the century and the British presence in Persia, which was then furthered by 
the fallout from World War 1 and the establishment of the mandate system.  This was 
largely centered on European states, however, and the rising importance of oil would 
                                                        
20 Quoted by Said Amir Arjomand in The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran 
(OUP, 1988), p. 76, this is a pre-Islamic, Sasanian, tract preserved from an 8th Century Arabic 
translation, attributed to Ardashir, son of Babak, the King of Kings to his successors among 
the Persian kings 
21 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/04/world/a-nation-challenged-ally-s-future-us-
pondering-saudis-vulnerability.html  
solidify the importance of Gulf stability within international security calculations. 
Supporting this were US efforts to create an alliance between the Iranians and the 
Saudis as a means of ensuring the stability of the Gulf region.  Of course, the revolution 
would prevent any chance of such an alliance gaining traction. 
 
It was the establishment of a religious dimension that would prove to be the catalyst 
for the emergence of a deeply fractious rivalry across the Gulf.  Whilst one should not 
reduce the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran to a religious competition – which 
overstresses the importance of religion and downplays the role of other factors – it is 
undeniable that religious competition added a new factor to the rivalry. It provided a 
new arena for competition and, given the importance of religion with the fabric of 
both states, religious rhetoric would take on existential importance.  
  
In addition to such rhetoric, Khomeini created a new constitution which enshrined 
religion within the fabric of the state.  This would be front and centre of the Islamic 
Republic’s foreign policy.  Article 3.16 would article how: 
 
the organization of the nation’s foreign policy based on Islamic criteria, 
fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unrestrained support for the 
impoverished people of the world.22  
 
Perhaps the most powerful example of this support to the downtrodden of the Muslim 
world can be seen in Lebanon, where the shi’a community had long experienced 
marginalization and persecution. The establishment of Hizballah, the Party of God in 
1982 demonstrated that the newly emboldened régime in Tehran was serious about 
providing support to marginalized groups across the region.  In the years that 
followed, one can trace this support to include groups such as Hamas, in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, who 
orchestrated a (failed) coup d’état against the Al Khalifa in 1982.23  
 
At this point, the Gulf region was in the throes of what appeared to be a war of 
attrition between Iran and Iraq, with the latter attempting to prevent the proliferation 
of revolutionary ideas across the region.  The demographic constitution of both states 
led to concerns in both capitals as to the loyalty of minority groups – be it sectarian or 
ethnic – amidst the suggestion that these may be 5th columns. Broader concern 
amongst sunni Arab states about Iranian expansionism ensured that Iraq had their 
support, however, only two years after the end of the war, their allegiance would 
move. 
 
Amidst Iraq’s expansionist aspirations, as seen in attempts to annex Kuwait, sunni 
Arab states, smaller in terms of demographics and military security yet with great 
                                                        
22 Iranian Constitution. Article 3.16. Available from: www.alaviandassociates.com/ 
documents/constitution.pdf [Accessed: 24 August 2010].  
 
23 Hasan T. Alhasan, ‘The Role of Iran in the failed coup of 1981: The IFLB  in Bahrain’, 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4 (2011)   
 
financial might, turned elsewhere to ensure their security. Despite the offer of 
protection from a wealthy Saudi millionaire who would later fund the attacks of 9/11, 
King Fahd preferred the military might of the United States, who would act as security 
guarantor, maintaining an ‘over the hill’ presence. 
 
In the following decade, a rapprochement with Iran shaped the nature of regional 
security, stemming in no small part from Saudi support to victims of a powerful 
earthquake in Iran that caused the deaths of 70,000 people.  At this time, leaders of 
both states visited the other to build trust and facilitate this rapprochement, yet in 
2001, world affairs shaped the regional security environment.  Following the 9/11 
attacks and the onset of the War on Terror, Saudi Arabia and Iran would find 
themselves on different sides, putting an end to this burgeoning friendship.  
 
In histhe State of the Union speech in early 2002, US President George Bush posited 
Iran as a member of an ‘axis of evil’, alongside Iraq and North Korea.  A year later, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom would lead to the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist 
régime and the installation of the Coalition Provisional Authority, a transitional 
government that would aim to facilitate the implementation of a democratic political 
system within Iraq. In the following years, Iraq would become a zone of proxy 
competition as Saudi Arabia sought to counter the increasing influence of Iran within 
Iraq. The ascendancy of Nouri Al Maliki and the Da’wa party would serve Iranian 
interests well, as a number of members of this shi’a party had sought refuge in Iran 
during the Ba’ath era. Fearing this, Riyadh regularly sought to reduce Tehran’s 
influence in Iraq whilst also urging the US to strike against the Iranian threat.  One US 
diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks recalls: 
 
the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to 
its nuclear weapons program.  "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," 
he recalled to the Chargé', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian 
influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.24 
 
The Kingdom’s long-standing security relationship with the US would continue in Iraq, 
despite the rising anti-American sentiment at this time.  Such a reliance would remain 
a source of antagonism across the Gulf, with Iran considering itself to be ‘uniquely 
qualified’ to ensure the security of the region. Tensions in Iraq would continue across 
the decade, as the struggle to preserve the sovereignty of the country would result in 
violence amongst a range of different actors.  
 
The Arab Uprisings and Regional Fragmentation  
 
In December 2010, Mohammad Bouazzizi, a Tunisian street vendor, self immolated. 
Frustrated at structural conditions across his country, coupled with a stagnating 
economy that provided few opportunities, Bouazzizi’s act triggered a wave of protests 
                                                        
24 08RIYADH649_a SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI POLICY 
TOWARDS IRAQ (20.04.08) Available from: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08RIYADH649_a.html 
across the Arab world that challenged régime-society relations, opening up a number 
of violent schisms. The fragmentation of régime-society relations provoked people to 
turn elsewhere to ensure their basic needs, facilitating a return to sub-state identities 
of religion and tribe and raising important questions about the about the construction 
of identity across the Middle East.  
 
The Arab Uprisings quickly spread across the region and a number of previously 
embedded autocratic rulers were deposed by popular veto.  Other régimes managed 
to maintain control over their populations through a range of different strategies, 
including the manipulation of domestic populations.   This fragmentation provided 
opportunities for a range of actors to improve their standing across the region, 
increasingly at the expense of the people of the Middle East as agency was 
marginalized by broader metanarratives. Such meta-narratives around sectarian 
identities denied local agency and created artificial schisms within societies that 
perpetuated broader geopolitical agendas.  
 
Whilst there is nothing inherently violent in sectarian difference, when such identities 
take on a political dimension they have the capacity to become violent. Such political 
context provides a lens through which to engage with domestic affairs and concepts 
get their meaning when placed within particular milieu.25  As such, amidst increasingly 
hostile and political framing about the nature of sectarian difference, violence became 
increasingly prominent part of difference. 
 
We must, at this point, identify that there are a number of deeply problematic issues 
at play here. As noted at the start of our exploration, Western analysis of Middle 
Eastern affairs still suffers from the legacy of Orientalism, also is beset by a lack of 
nuance about theological difference and the nature of relationships between different 
groups. In particular, a great deal of analysis on the events of the Arab Uprisings 
suggested that Iran was guilty of manipulating the behavior of shi’a groups across the 
region.  If one goes deeper, one sees that there are two serious problems with such a 
claim.  First is a legacy of Arab-Persian tensions which has characterized the region for 
centuries and continues to do so.26 Secondly, is that within the hierarchy of shi’a Islam, 
clerics in Najaf are seen by many to possess much greater legitimacy than their Iranian 
counterparts in Qom. Moreover, there are serious political differences between 
clerics in Najaf and Qom, with the former suggesting that clerics should remain outside 
politics whilst the latter advocates clerical involvement.  
 
Despite this, lazy analysis suggests that a malevolent Iranian hand is behind unrest 
across the region. If one considers events in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, following 
events in Iraq, one can see that societies were characterized by sectarian difference. 
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Within these contexts, régimes and external actors were able to frame events within 
particular ways as a means of ensuring their survival and the furthering of geopolitical 
interests.  Such factors are also seen in the strategy that both apply to oil issues, 
particularly efforts by the Al Sa’ud to drive down prices in an attempt to detrimentally 
impact upon an Iranian economy less able to take the hit of low prices. 
 
For reasons of brevity we are not able to offer an in depth exploration of the nature 
of proxy competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran in all of these cases.  Instead, we 
offer a brief overview that demonstrates how religion has been used as a political tool 
to engender support to presumed sectarian kin across the region. Historical precedent 
coloured the views of many as to the extent of Iranian involvement with shi’a groups 
across the region. Indeed, in the aftermath of the protests, many régimes sought to 
frame events as a consequence of Iranian manipulation.  
 
In Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, Iran provided support for shi’a groups, albeit in a range 
of different guises. In Bahrain, Iranian involvement in the protests is difficult to 
accurately ascertain, despite a number of allegations to the contrary. 27  Protest 
movements took to the streets of the island in early 2011, calling for better democratic 
processes, comprised of both sunna and shi’a. In the months that followed, the Al 
Khalifa régime framed events as part of a broader programme of Iranian intervention 
in, and manipulation of internal affairs.  In addition, a Saudi-led Gulf Co-Operation 
Council Peninsular Shield Force was deployed to prevent the protesers from gaining 
too much ground.  In the following years, the shi’a threat was securitized and 
structural processes were created and modified to restrict the capacity of shi’a agency 
to act. Similar issues arise in Yemen, where Houthi rebels directly challenge the 
government in Sana’a, which is supported by Saudi Arabia. Regular cross border 
incursions into the Kingdom forced Saudi Arabia to become directly involved in the 
conflict, participating in a bombing campaign to eradicate the Houthi threat, yet in 
doing so, contributing to a large scale humanitarian disaster.  
 
The most devastating case, however, is in Syria, which is widely accepted to be the 
worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. In the six years since the uprisings, 
around 500,000 people have been killed whilst 11 million people have been displaced 
from their homes. The uprisings in Syria provided Saudi Arabia with a strong 
opportunity to weaken Iranian influence across the region and to break the so-called 
‘Axis of Resistance’ between Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas.28  Sensing this threat, 
members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps became increasingly involved in 
the conflict and in doing so, ensured the survival of the Assad regime. 
 
Following the escalation of the Syrian conflict, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Adel Al 
Jubeir, set out perceptions of the Iranian regime, exposing: 
 
its true [character], as expressed by [its] support for terror, and continue the 
                                                        
27 See Matthiessen, Op. Cit., and ‘Restricting the Space, Responding to Protest: The Case of 
Bahrain’, Global Discourse with Sossie Kasbarrian. Vol .6 No.4, 2016. 
28 El Husseini, Op. Cit. 
policy of undermining the security and stability of the region's countries... By 
defending the actions of terrorists and justifying them, the Iranian régime 
becomes a partner to their crimes, and it bears full responsibility for its policy 
of incitement and escalation."29 
 
Whilst the rise of Da’ish had occupied the minds of many, for Adel al Jubeir, Iran posed 
the most serious threat to regional stability.  Indeed, for Jubeir, Iran was “the single-
most-belligerent-actor in the region, and its actions display both a commitment to 
regional hegemony and a deeply held view that conciliatory gestures signal weakness 




It is clear that religion matters, but we must not dismiss the importance of other 
aspects of identity that define both individuals and groups, but also feed back into 
religion. The construction – and performance – of identity is essential to 
understanding the rivalry, yet we should be careful not to frame identity in binary, 
zero-sum ways. Identity is a complex, malleable construct, which resides at the heart 
of contemporary politics and whilst not necessarily the driving factor of political 
action, it certainly underpins much of what occurs. Religion has a prominent role to 
play within such identities, along with the political behavior of actors who bear these 
identities. 
 
Within these struggles for identity – and efforts to secure legitimacy within these 
struggles – we can locate broader regional struggles that harness religion as a means 
of achieving their political ends. Iran and Saudi Arabia are effectively engaged in a new 
Cold War; yet it is unlikely that either party would seek actually directly to engage 
militarily.  This is largely “war” by proxy, soft-power projection but, in Yemen for 
example, the heat can rise sharply.  Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have crossed the 
sectarian fault line in seeking regional allies, although we should be reminded that 
Iran has also allied itself with Hamas.  Perhaps this is more of a strategic call for Iran 
than Saudi, as a ‘purely sectarian frame locks them into a minority position in most 
countries’31.  
 
The ramifications of using religion as a means of securing legitimacy are felt across the 
region. Of course, religious tensions have political ramifications, and the onset of 
proxy conflicts across the Middle East is a consequence of the differences between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, driven by the instrumentalised use of religion. We must not 
downplay the prominence of religion within the rivalry, yet we must not overstate it 
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either. Instead, we must remember that religion plays a prominent role within political 
rivalries, but only as a contributing factor. To reduce tensions in the rivalry between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, we must be conscious of the role that religion plays in escalating 
tensions, but we must also address other factors that have a much stronger impact 
across the region. Until we do this, we risk misplacing the focus of our analysis with 
potentially dangerous consequences.  
 
 
 
 
